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Abstract 
This study provides an international evidence of how credit information sharing coverage and depth impact on 
bank non-performing loans across the income brackets categorized by the World Bank. Employing anova and 
robust standard errors OLS estimation techniques, the results suggest that both coverage and depth of 
information shared are imperative in reducing bank non-performing loans. However, coverage of credit 
information shared is more effective in reducing non-performing loans with public credit registries while depth 
of information shared is more effective with private credit bureaus. The findings further prove that the use of 
both private and public bureaus and registries are more effective in reducing non-performing loans than using 
either of them. The study finally finds that non-performing in low income countries varied significantly from that 
of high income countries. These findings are largely consistent with previous studies and require the 
implementation of policies that deepen the coverage and depth of credit information shared across the income 
brackets especially low income countries. 
 
1. Introduction 
Information sharing through Credit Referencing Bureaus (CRBs) have become one of the credit risk 
management tools employed by banks in recent times especial on continent of Africa although information 
sharing have been in existence for a long time in some European and American countries. Credit Referencing 
Bureaus are private or public institutions that collect financial data, process the data, store it and at the request of 
lenders and other financial institutions, they (CRBs) share or provide the credit worthiness status or report for 
lending decision by the requesting institution. Empirical studies suggest that information sharing through CRBs 
are able to help reduce adverse selection (Pagano and Jappelli, 1993) and moral hazard (Padilla and Pagano, 
2000) which in turn reduce non-performing loans (credit risk). Specifically on the effect of information sharing 
through CRBs on credit risk, studies argue that information sharing reduces credit risk exposure through the 
screening and incentive effects. For instance, Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) found that information sharing 
through CRBs help improve delinquent loans. Again, Brown and Zehnder (2007) also find that CRBs can help 
improve loan repayment. Powell et al. (2004) also proves that CRBs are able to reduce default rates. Kallberg 
and Udell (2003), Brown et al. (2009) and Bennardo et al. (2007) have found similar results. These studies have 
focused on the impact of credit information sharing on bank non-performing loans at either country or sub-
regional levels. However, none of these studies cited considered the impact of credit information sharing 
coverage and depth on bank non-performing loans at the global level. Hence, this study attempts to establish the 
impact of credit information sharing coverage and depth on non-performing loans at a globe level employing the 
five income brackets defined by the World Bank since the income brackets capture all countries in the world. 
Again, following the arguments of Miller (2003) and Triki and Gajigo (2012) that private credit bureaus are 
more effective that public credit registries, we examine this argument at the global level using private credit 
bureau and public credit registry coverage. The study further explore if the depth of information shared impacts 
non-perform loans. Again, the reacts credit depth of information shared with private bureau coverage and public 
registry coverage. The study also tests for significant difference (if any) in non-performing loans among the 
income brackets. We are motivated to test for difference in non-performing loans due to that arguments that high 
income countries (developed countries) have better financial regulations and institutions (see Miller, 2003; 
Dankov et al., 2007) than the low income countries (developing countries). From the above, it is evident that the 
impact of impact of credit information sharing coverage and depth on non-performing loans are important and 
long overdue. Hence, this study fills these gaps using the five income bracket groupings by the World Bank. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Theoretical Review: Information Asymmetry and Information Sharing 
Earlier theoretical review suggests that credit risk in banks emanates from information asymmetry leading to 
adverse selection and moral hazard (see Freimer and Gordon, 1965; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Freixas and 
Rochet, 1997). Information asymmetry can be viewed as the lack of complete information in the credit market 
from both the lenders and borrowers side ((Freixas and Rochet, 1997; Myerson, 1991; Aumann, 1987). In an 
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attempt to reduce the effect of information asymmetry which may lead to credit risk, Gehrig and Stenbacka 
(2007), Padilla and Pagano (1997), Padilla and Pagano, (2000), Pagano and Jappelli (1993) and Kallberg and 
Udell (2003) prove and suggest that information sharing in the credit market helps to reduce adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Information sharing in the credit market is done through either public or private credit 
referencing bureaus. These bureaus collect credit or financial data, process the data and report on the credit 
worthiness of individuals and corporate entities at the request of banks and other financial institutions. Though 
both private and public credit bureaus are perfect substitutes in theory, empirical evidence or studies suggest that 
private credit bureaus are more effective (see Miller, 2003; Singh et al., 2009).  
 
2.2 Empirical Review 
The impact of information sharing through credit referencing bureaus has received much attention in recent years 
especially in developing economies. Empirical studies suggest that information sharing have several impacts on 
banks especially credit risk. Studies that examine the impact of information sharing on bank credit risk argue in 
two ways: screening and incentive effects (Brown et al., 2009 and Djankov et al., 2007). First, the screening 
effect suggest that information sharing enables banks evaluate and identify clients ability to service or repay their 
loans, hence enhance the default predictive power of banks and making them more robust to adverse selection 
(Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). Second, the incentive effect pose that bank clients are motivated to repay or service 
loans because of the fear of future denial of loan or credit by another lender because default with one lender is 
captured and shared by all lenders. Hence, bank clients are pressured to perform and settle their loans because of 
denial of credit in the future upon default (Padilla and Pagano, 2000). We highlight some key empirical studies 
on the effect of information sharing on credit risk. 
Pagano and Jappelli (1993) revealed that information sharing reduces or counters adverse selection. 
That is information sharing among lenders allow loans to be advanced to good borrowers who would not have 
received loans or credit where banks or lenders did not share credit information on borrowers. This leads to 
increased aggregate lending in the credit market. Also, Padilla and Pagano (2000) prove that Credit-sharing 
institutions can raise the borrowers’ cost of defaulting loans or credit thereby increasing loan repayment by 
borrowers, hence moral hazard. 
Jappelli and Pagano (2002) illustrated that credit information sharing through credit referencing 
bureaus increases bank lending and reduces default rates. Kallberg and Udell (2003) also point out that historical 
information collated by credit bureaus have powerful default predictive ability, hence making banks more 
resistant to adverse selection and in turn reducing bank credit risk. 
Barron and Staten (2003) also provide evidence that lenders can significantly reduce default rates by 
sharing and involving more complete and in-depth borrower information in their predictive models. Also, Powell 
et al. (2004) employ banks in Brazil and Argentina and found similar results indicating that more information 
sharing leads to reduced default rates. 
Berger and Frame (2006) demonstrated that information sharing increases quantity of small business 
loans and also extended credit to marginal borrowers on the US. Bennardo, Pagano and Piccolo (2007) show that 
over-indebtedness can be reduced through sharing of credit information among lenders and banks as individual 
borrowers classified as highly indebted receive less credit and ultimately reduce the over-indebtedness of 
borrowers. 
Brown and Zehnder (2007) empirically established that the credit market would collapse in the 
absence of credit information sharing and reputational banking. Their study further suggested that information 
sharing encourages borrowers to honor their loans thereby allowing lenders to identify borrowers with good 
credit history. Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) proved that credit information sharing borrowers improve their 
repayment performance as delinquent repayment decreased. 
 
3. Methodology 
In this study, the panel and anova techniques are employed. The anova technique is used to establish the 
difference in non-performing loans among income brackets. The null hypothesis affirms that difference in mean 
values of bank non-performing loans for all the income brackets are  the same and equal to zero while the 
alternate hypothesis affirms that the difference in mean values of bank non-performing loans are all not the same 
and not equal to zero. The null and alternate hypotheses of the anova technique are mathematically stated as: 
Ho: µ1= µ2 = µ3 = µ4= µ5 = 0 
Ha: µ1≠ µ2 ≠ µ3 ≠ µ4 ≠ µ5 ≠ 0 
The study also takes advantage of the superior qualities of a panel data as suggest by Wooldridge 
(2008) and Brooks (2008) to examine how private credit bureaus coverage (PCBC), public credit resgistries 
coverage (PCRC) and depth of credit information shared (CII) impact on non-performing loans across the five 
income brackets from 2000 to 2013. The study again react PCBC and PCRC with CII to establish the impact of 
coverage, quality and availability credit information shared through private bureaus and public registries on bank 
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non-performing loans. The study obtained income bracket variables from World Development Indicators (WDI).  
The general form of a panel data model is stated as Yit=  αi + γt + βXit + εit  ………..(1) 
Where: Subscript i indicates the cross sectional dimension (income bracket) i=1. . . N and t indicates 
the time series dimension (time), t=1…T; Yit is the dependent variable; αi is scalar and constant term for all 
periods (t) and specific to an income bracket (i); γt is the time fixed effect; β is a k×1 vector of parameters to be 
estimated on the independent variables for the independent variables; Xit is a 1× k vector of observations on the 
independent variables comprising of independent variables in the model which includes controlled variables and 
Εit which is iid is the error term. 
From an econometrics point of view, we estimate our regression models and expressed it as: 
NPLit = β0it + β1 GDPGit + β2 GDSit + β3  IRSit + β4 CPIit + εit…… (2) 
NPLit = β0it + β1 PCRCit + β2 GDPGit + β3 GDSit + β4  IRSit + β5 CPIit + εit…… (3) 
NPLit = β0it + β1 PCBCit + β2 GDPGit + β3 GDSit + β4  IRSit + β5 CPIit + εit…… (4) 
NPLit = β0it + β1 CIIit + β2 GDPGit + β3 GDSit + β4  IRSit + β5 CPIit + εit…… (5) 
NPLit = β0it + β1 (PCRCit x CIIit) + β2 GDPGit + β3 GDSit + β4  IRSit + β5 CPIit + εit…… (6) 
NPLit = β0it + β1 (PCBCit x CIIit ) + β2 GDPGit + β3 GDSit + β4  IRSit + β5 CPIit + εit…… (7) 
 
3.1 Variable Description and Selection 
Non-Performing loans (NPL) 
Following Lousiz (2012), Aver (2008) and  Fofack (2005) non-performing loan is employed as a dependent 
variable in the is study. Non-performing loans is the aggregation or combination of all past defaulted loans in a 
given income bracket as a point in time. Non-performing loans are seen as undesirable outputs in the financial 
systems that needs to be minimized or at best eradicated (Fujii, Managi and Matousek, 2014). Non-performing 
loan is sourced from World Development Indictors (WDI) and measured as a ratio of non-performing loans to 
gross loans and advances. 
Private Credit Bureaus coverage (PCBC), Public Credit Registries Coverage (PCRC) and Credit 
Information Sharing Depth (CII) 
Three (3) different variables are used to proxy information sharing. Credit referencing bureau be it private or 
public is deemed to have a negative impact on non-performing (Behr and Sonnekalb, 2012; Berger and Frame, 
2006; Kallberg and Udell, 2003; Barron & Staten, 2003; Powell et al., 2004). The study proxy private credit 
bureaus and public credit registries with private credit bureaus coverage and public credit registry coverage in 
the income brackets. However following Miller (2003) and Triki and Gajigo (2012), the study expects both 
proxies will have an inverse relationship with non-performing loans but with private bureaus being more 
effective. These variables are adapted from WDI and measured as the percentage of adults covered by the 
information sharing institution (whether private or public) to the total population. CII measures the rules 
affecting the deepness, accessibility and quality of credit information sharing through private and public credit 
referencing bureaus and registries. The index ranges from 0 to 6, with higher values indicating the deepened, 
availability and quality of credit information shared from public registries and a private bureaus, to facilitate 
lending decisions. The study expects that non-performing loans and CII to be negatively related.  
Gross Domestic Product Growth (GDPG) 
There appears to be empirical evidence of an inverse relationship between the growth in GDP and non-
performing loans (see Salas and Suarina, 2002; Rajan and Dhal, 2003; Fofack, 2005; and Jimenez and Saurina, 
2005). The justification presented by earlier empirical studies for this negative relationship is that strong positive 
growth in GDP often translates or converts into more income which boots up the debt servicing ability of 
borrower which in tend lowers non-performing loans. Gross domestic product growth is measured as the current 
year’s gross domestic product minus the year’s gross domestic product all divided by the previous year’s gross 
domestic product. 
Gross Domestic Savings (GDS) 
Gross Domestic Savings measures the amount of money residence in an income bracket is able to save or keep 
out of their disposable income. Gross domestic savings is obtained from WDI and computed as a ratio of gross 
domestic savings to gross domestic product. Following the classical theory of economics, the study expects a 
positive impact of gross domestic savings on non-performing loans. That is, an increase in savings leads to 
increased availability of credit to advanced as loans and hence, a higher probability of increased non-performing 
loans. 
Interest Rate Spread (IRS) 
Interest rate spread is measured as the difference between the lending rate and deposit rate of a country. Interest 
rate spread is viewed as cost to access to credit. That is, since interest rate spread is seen as a cost to access to 
finance, an increase in lending rate will lead to an increase in interest rate spread and hence, reduces the ability 
or willingness of borrowers to honour loan servicing adequately and promptly (Jiménez and Saurina, 2005; Aver, 
2008) and hence increasing non-performing loans. The study anticipates a positive impact of interest rate spread 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.6, No.18, 2015 
 
20 
on non-performing loans. The interest rate variable id obtained from WDI. 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
The study uses consumer price index as an inflation variable sourced from WDI. Literature provides proof of a 
positive relationship between the inflation rate and non-performing (see Louzis 2012; Chaibi and Ftiti 2015; 
Fofack, 2005). These studies argue that as inflation soars up, it reduces the ability of borrowers to honor their 
loan repayment leading to increased default. However following classical theory of economic, this study expects 
a negative relation between non-performing loans and inflation. This is because; classical theory of economics 
suggests that inflation reduces the monetary value or purchasing power of currencies implying that the monetary 
value of accumulated non-performing loans will reduce; hence a negative relationship. 
Table 1: Summary of Variables 
Variables Smybol Source of Data 
Expected 
Sign Description 
Measurement of Variables 
Non-
Performing 
Loans npl 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
Dependent 
Variable 
Non-Performing Loans 
divided by gross loans and 
advances 
Public Credit 
Registry 
Coverage pcrc 
World 
Development 
Indicators - 
Independent 
Variable 
Adult population covered by 
Public Credit Registries 
divided by total population 
Private Credit 
Bureaus 
Coverage pcbc 
World 
Development 
Indicators - 
Independent 
Variable 
Adult population covered by 
Private Credit Bureaus divided 
by total population 
Credit 
Information 
Sharing Depth lncii 
World 
Development 
Indicators - 
Independent 
Variable 
As measured by World 
Development Indictors 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
Growth gpdg 
World 
Development 
Indicators - 
Independent 
Variable 
Current year GDP minus 
previous year GDP divided by 
previous year GDP 
Gross 
Domestic 
Saving gds 
World 
Development 
Indicators + 
Independent 
Variable 
Gross Domestic Saving 
divided by Gross domestic 
product 
Interest Rate 
Spread lnirs 
World 
Development 
Indicators + 
Independent 
Variable 
Log of Lending rate minus 
deposit rate 
Consumer 
Price Index cpi 
World 
Development 
Indicators - 
Independent 
Variable 
As measured by World 
Development Indictors 
 
4. Empirical Results 
Table 2 below shows the descriptive statistics on the variables employed in the robust standard errors Ordinary 
Least Squares estimation technique used for this study. The descriptive statistics table covers periods between 
2000 and 2013. The table shows the mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, normatity (SWilk) and the 
acceptability (VIF) of each variable. From the minimum and maximum values of each variable, it is evident that 
none of the values is an outlier. Brook (2008) state that outliers distort the precision of regression estimates; 
hence leading to inconsistent, inefficient and biased coefficient estimates. From this, the study eliminates the 
effect of outliers. The standard deviation as reports mild variation within the variables indicating evidence of 
preciseness of model estimates. From the Shaprio Wilk normality test (SWilk), all (except for interest rate spread) 
the variables are significant and normality distributed around their means implying that the variables are linear 
and hence a linear regression can be used to estimate these variables. Wooldridge (2008) states that it is 
imperative to test for normality in order to choose either normal or non-normal distribution estimation form for 
coefficient estimates to be BLUE.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Swilk VIF 
npl 46 0.0519 0.0348 0.0130 0.1720 0.0000*** - 
pcrc 70 0.0433 0.0456 0.0000 0.1612 0.0000*** 1.72 
pcbc 70 0.1285 0.1597 0.0000 0.5288 0.0000*** 1.77 
lncii 50 0.9075 0.5119 -0.2136 1.4458 0.0000*** 2.24 
gpdg 70 0.0493 0.0225 -0.0355 0.0865 0.0138** 1.73 
gds 68 0.2363 0.0777 0.0886 0.3443 0.0000*** 1.72 
cpi 70 0.0497 0.0208 0.0120 0.1106 0.0026*** 1.35 
lnirs 56 0.0781 0.0232 0.0388 0.1352 0.1476 2.33 
Significance Level: (*)< 10%, (**)< 5%, (***)< 1% 
Table 3 below presents the Pearson’s correlation matrix which serves as a means for screening for high 
collinearity between pairs of the independent variables.  Following Kennedy (2008), the study set a threshold of 
0.7 for the Pearson’s correlation to be considered as multicollinear.  Hence, the study finds evidence of 
multicollinearity between logged values of credit information sharing depth and interest rate spread. However, 
the two variables are kept in the OLS model because, Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) in Table 2 suggest that 
both variables are acceptable in the model and can be used since their VIF values do not exceed the threshold of 
10 (Brook, 2009; Kennedy, 2008).  
Table 3: Pearson’s Correlation Matrix 
npl pcrc pcbc lncii gpdg gds cpi lnirs 
npl 1 
pcrc -0.5476*** 1 
pcbc -0.5293*** 0.7796*** 1 
lncii -0.5637*** 0.7944*** 0.8032*** 1 
gpdg -0.0086 -0.1126 -0.4122*** -0.4464*** 1 
gds -0.1078 0.5000*** 0.2497** 0.657*** 0.2544** 1 
cpi 0.1127 -0.2195* -0.4512*** -0.5565*** 0.4949*** -0.1148 1 
lnirs 0.6677*** -0.4547*** -0.6567*** -0.8400*** 0.1646 -0.5677*** 0.4229*** 1 
Significance Level: (*)< 10%, (**)< 5%, (***)< 1% 
Table 4a below reports the anova results of the difference in bank non-performing loans across the 
income bracket groups as per the World Bank classification. With a null hypothesis of no significant difference 
in access to bank credit to private sector across the five income bracket groupings, the anova results repots an F-
critical of 2.8270 and a p-value of 0.0650 indicating that the study rejects the null hypothesis of no significant 
difference in bank non-performing loans across the income bracket groupings and concludes that there is a 
significant difference (under 10%) in bank non-performing loans across the income bracket groupings.  
 
4.1 ANOVA Results 
Table 4a: Difference in Bank Non-performing loans across the Income Brackets 
ANOVA 
Source of Variation SS df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 0.0087 3 0.0029 2.6587 0.0605* 2.8270 
Within Groups 0.0459 42 0.0011       
Total 0.0546 45         
Significance Level: (*)< 10%, (**)< 5%, (***)< 1% 
Further analysis of the anova technique shown in Table 4b below reveals that Low Income Countries’ 
bracket is the only income bracket group that is significantly different from the other income brackets. 
Significant under 1%, a unit increase in Low income countries will results in 0.038 unit increase in non-
performing loans across all the income brackets.  This finding provides evidence in support of result earlier 
empirical studies that argue that high income countries (developed countries) have strong credit regulations and 
institutions which make the financial system more effective and efficient in dealing undesirable (see Miller, 2003, 
Ahmad and Ariff, 2007). 
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Table 4b: Difference in Bank Non-performing loans between the Income Brackets 
NPL Coef. T-Stats 
High Income Countries - - 
Upper Middle Income Countries 0.024 1.79 
Middle Income Countries 0.027 1.92 
Low Middle Countries 0.038 2.71*** 
R-Squared 0.16   
No. of Obs. 45   
Significance Level: (*)< 10%, (**)< 5%, (***)< 1% 
 
4.2 OLS Robust Standard Errors Regression Results 
Table 5 below reports the OLS robust standard errors regression outputs of six different non-performing loans 
models.  Model 1is the baseline model and estimated using no credit information sharing variable while Models 
2 and 3 are estimated using public credit registries coverage (pcrc) and private credit bureaus coverage (pcbc) 
respectively. In model 4, credit information sharing depth (representing accessibility, quality and span of 
information sharing) of both private bureaus and public registries (lncii) is employed to estimate the non-
performing loans model while in models 5 and 6 public credit registries coverage (pcrc) and private credit 
bureaus coverage (pcbc) are reacted with credit information sharing depth (lncii) respectively.  
Table 5: Impact of Credit information Sharing Coverage and Depth on Bank Non-Performing Loans 
  
NPL Model 
1 
NPL Model 
2 
NPL Model 
3 
NPL Model 
4 
NPL Model 
5 
NPL Model 
6 
pcrc -0.303 
  (3.95)*** 
pcbc -0.068 
  (1.16) 
lncii -0.033 
  (3.65)*** 
pcrc X lncii -0.093 
  (2.57)** 
pcbc X lncii -0.076 
  (3.29)*** 
gpdg -0.816 -0.771 -0.754 -0.350 -0.345 -0.275 
  (4.22)*** (4.58)*** (4.28)*** (5.30)*** (3.57)*** (3.42)*** 
gds 0.126 0.290 0.178 0.157 0.177 0.084 
  (1.16) (2.69)** (1.29) (6.90)*** (3.87)*** (2.24)** 
cpi -0.631 -0.560 -0.588 -0.198 -0.185 -0.166 
  (3.13)*** (3.23)*** (2.93)*** (4.58)*** (2.69)*** (2.67)** 
lnirs 0.156 0.142 0.141 0.038 0.053 0.007 
  (6.38)*** (5.40)*** (4.60)*** (8.04)*** (5.38)*** (0.42) 
cons 0.518 0.442 0.463 0.166 0.168 0.074 
  (6.27)*** (4.89)*** (4.35)*** (14.38)*** (6.35)** (1.91) 
R-Square 0.7 0.78 0.72 0.79 0.69 0.73 
Obs. 36 36 36 23 23 23 
Prob>F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Significance Level: (*)< 10%, (**)< 5%, (***)< 1% 
From Table 5 above, the baseline model (Model 1) is estimated excluding information sharing 
variables. Model 1 is able to explain 70% of the total variations in non-performing loans across the income 
brackets without the inclusion of information sharing variables. It further reports that gross domestic product 
growth rate and inflation rate are negatively related to bank non-performing loans while gross domestic savings 
and inflation are positively related to bank non-performing loans. However, gross domestic product growth rate, 
inflation and interest rate spread were the only significant variables. 
In models 2 and 3, the study employs public credit registry coverage and private credit bureau 
coverage respectively to establish the impact of information sharing on bank non-performing loans. Significant 
under 1%, public credit registry coverage reduces bank non-performing loans by 30.3%  in model 2 while private 
credit bureau coverage reduces bank non-performing loans by 6.8% but insignificant in model 3. Gross domestic 
product growth rate, inflation and interest rate spreads are consistently significant under 1% in models 2 and 3 
while gross domestic savings is only significant under 5% in model 2. Model 2 is able to explain 78% of the total 
variations in bank non-performing loans while model 3 explains 72% of that same variation. This finding implies 
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that public credit registries are more effective in reducing and explaining the variations in bank non-performing 
loans than private credit bureau in terms of coverage. This contradicts the finding of Miller (2003). 
From Table 5, Model 4 (preferred model) reports the impact of private bureaus and public registry 
credit information sharing depth on bank non-performing loans. The Model reports that a 100% increase in depth 
of information shared by both private bureaus and public registries results in 3.3% reduction in bank non-
performing loans across the income brackets and is significant under 1%. Again gross domestic product growth 
rate and inflation rate are significantly and negatively related to bank non-performing loans while gross domestic 
savings and inflation are positively and significantly related to bank non-performing loans. this finding is in line 
with Kallberg and Udell (2003) and Barron and Staten (2003) who argue that the inclusion of more in-depth or 
detailed data make banks robust to adverse selection and moral hazard and hence reduced bank non-performing 
loans. Model 4 is the preferred model and is able to explain 79% (highest compared to the other five models) of 
the total variation in non-performing loans across the income brackets. 
In models 5 and 6, the study interacts depth of credit information shared with public credit registry 
coverage and private credit bureau coverage respectively to establish the impact of information sharing on bank 
non-performing loans. Significant under 5% and 1% in models 5 and 6 respectively, the interaction between 
depths of information shared with public credit registry coverage and private credit bureau coverage reduces 
bank non-performing loans by 9.3% and 7.6% in models 5 and 6 respectively across the income brackets. Gross 
domestic product growth rate, gross domestic savings and inflation are consistently significant in models 5 and 6. 
Additional in model 5, interest rate spread is significant under 1%. Model 5 is able to explain 69% of the total 
variations in bank non-performing loans while model 6 explains 73% of that same variation. This finding implies 
increasing the coverage and depth of information shared by private credit bureau and public credit registries 
reduces bank non-performing loans. However, private bureaus are more effective in reducing bank non-
performing loans. This findings supports that assert of Miller (2003) that private bureaus are more effective due 
to their ability to collect or gather more detailed credit data or information. 
 
5. Robustness Checks and Diagnostics 
To ensure our OLS model produces the best linear, unbiased and efficient coefficients, the study checks for 
outliers, multicollinearity, normality of variables, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The study screened for 
outlier and found no outlier using the descriptive statistics. The pearson’s correlation and Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) were employed to check for multicollineraity.  
To ensure normality of variables (which is a key assumptions in regression), the study used the Shaprio 
Wilk normality test which provided evidence of normality (under 1%) for all variables except for interest rate 
spread. Employing the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity and Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation, the study found evidence of non-constant variance and autocorrelated residuals in the models. 
Hence, the study employed the robust standard error option to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
in Stata 13. From the robust standard errors OLS regression outputs in Table 5, all the variable together are 
jointly significant (as indicated by Prob> F = 0.0000) and are able to explain the total variation in bank non-
performing loans across the five income bracket groupings by the World Bank. Again with a total number of 70 
observations (five (5) income brackets multiplied by 14 years of data (2000 to 2013)), models 1 to 3 captures 
51.43% of total observations while models 4 to 6 captures 37.14% of the total observations. Hence, the study 
exceeds the econometrics threshold of 30% for all the six (6) models. These are indications that the models are 
fit and can be used for generalization to a large extent. 
 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Information sharing is argued to have several benefits to the credit market and hence has attracted much attention 
from both corporate and academic researchers at country and sub-regional levels. In this study, the paper 
investigate the impact of information sharing coverage and depth (for both private and public credit referencing) 
on bank non-performing loans across the five income brackets. The study is able to provide a number of 
international evidences. First, the study establish that non-performance loans in low income countries vary 
significantly from the higher income bracket countries inducing the argument that higher income countries have 
better financial regulations and institutions that are robust to undesirable outputs in their financial systems (see 
Miller, 2003; Ahmad and Ariff, 2007; Brown et al., 2009). Second, the study establishes that in terms of 
coverage, public credit registries are more effective compared to private credit bureaus in reducing bank 
nonperforming loans which contradicts the finding of Miller (2003). However interacting coverage and depth of 
information shared, private bureaus became more effective in reducing bank non-performing loans than public 
credit registries which is consistent with Miller (2003). This third finding implies that, both coverage and depth 
of information shared are superiorly important in reducing non-performing loans. Four, the study is able to 
establish that employing the services of both private credit bureaus and public credit registries are most robust to 
dealing with bank non-performing loans. The study further found gross domestic product growth rate, gross 
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domestic savings, inflation and interest rate spread to be significant determinants of non-performing loans to a 
large extent. 
These findings have policy implications across the income bracket groupings for reducing non-
performing loans. First, low income countries can emulate from the financial system of high income countries 
and tailor it to suit the present conditions of their system financial system so as to enable low income countries to 
reduce bank non-performing loans. Second, countries must do well to enact policies that deepen both coverage 
and depth of information shared as a combination of both is more robust to reducing bank non-performing loans. 
Third, a combination of both private credit bureau and public credit registry services can also be useful in 
dealing with bank non-performing loans. For the purpose of future research direction, researchers could examine 
the factors that enhance or improve credit information sharing. Again, researchers could replicate this study 
using country level data to test for consistency in findings. 
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